

**Document A: “Forefathers of the Israel Defense Forces”
Yaakov Goldstein (1994)**

In general, from a security viewpoint, it's possible to divide the time of the First Aliyah (1882-1902) into three periods: a) the Heroic period B) Baron Rothschild's sponsorship C) The crisis period that came with the transition to the Jewish Colonization Association (1900), and which continued into the Second Aliyah. ...

In the heroic period – which encompassed the first phase of settlement – the settlers were forced to prove to their neighbors their ability to stand up for their rights. This included, of course, first and foremost the defense of person and property. ...

The sponsorship period saw the responsibility for protecting the colonies transferred from the settlers themselves to the Baron's officials. ... These clerks operated in a chain of command that was based on: a) Relations with the Turkish authorities by using the Baron's name and the influence of the European consuls ... b) Bribery – "buying off" – local aggressive actors.

The protective umbrella of the Baron provided relatively peaceful relations for the colonies, although this did not prevent the thievery and damage to property, which required guards. The guards were, in most cases, non-Jews. ... This transfer of responsibility for the protection of body and belongings from the settlers to the Baron's officials and on to Jewish and non-Jewish contractors led to a weakening of initiative, a loss of spontaneity of action, and the erosion of the spiritual and physical ability for self-defense among the farmers – the foundations for which had started to develop in the early period. ...

A characteristic story is that of Petach-Tikvah, a good section of which enjoyed the protection of the Baron, and one of the neighboring Arab sheikhs, Sheikh Abu-Rabah, with whom there were many problems. In 1891, the clerks reached an interesting understanding:

"Abu-Rabah was obliged to 'defend' the colony at an annual wage, and frequently he would take various things, like a cart, harnesses, trees, work tools and so on that he would 'forget,' of course, to return. The clerks also gave – for the sake of good will – a 200 dunam portion of land that was plowed with a tractor at his request."

We are in fact speaking here of a partial subjugation to a local Arab attacker, and this in regards to a large settlement like Petach-Tikvah which had a tradition of self-defense and well-known Jewish guards.

Source: Forefathers of the Israel Defense Forces: The Bar Giora and HaShomer Underground Associations 1907-1935 (BeDerech el haYa'ad), Yaakov Goldstein, Ministry of Defense, Israel, 1994, p. 8-9.

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Bar-Giora, from the moment it arrived [in the settlement of Sejera in the Galilee], endeavored to take over security, while the director, Eliyahu Krause, refused. Even before they took charge of security, and afterwards, the people of Bar-Giora engaged in physical training, in weapons instruction and target practice. In their time off, they toured to learn the surroundings. They also learned Arabic and Arab customs. Krause, despite his sympathy for the youths, was not inclined to hand over protection of the farm only to Jews, and for the same reasons that characterized the resistance of the settlements to Hebrew guards in general: They didn't believe in its effectiveness. They were afraid to endanger the lives of young Jews, and above all, they feared the transition to Jewish defenders would endanger the settlements because of the desire for revenge of the non-Jewish guards. Also they were afraid of “goom” [blood revenge] ... In regard to the Sejera farm, it's said that the opposition of E. Krause was broken the moment the Circassian guard wasn't filling his duty. The chapter occurred on the night when “Bar Giora” removed a mule from the stable of the farm. They roused Krause and showed him the quality of the Circassian's defense. Only then did Krause fire the Circassian and hire Tzvi Becker [a Bar Giora member] in his place.

Source: Forefathers of the Israel Defense Forces: The Bar Giora and HaShomer Underground Associations 1907-1935 (BeDerech el haYa'ad), Yaakov Goldstein, Ministry of Defense, Israel, 1994, p. 22.

Document C: “History of the Haganah”, (1954)

These were the days of the revolution of the Young Turks and the declaration of liberty [hürriyet]. As we have seen, this event, together with the general rejoicing, brought with it a feeling among the bedouins and fellahin [Arab peasants] of breaking a yoke, on the assumption that there was no longer law or judge. The atmosphere in the Lower Galilee, which had been tense since the early days of the settlement, served as a convenient backdrop for clashes. In 1909, land disputes broke out between the village of Kana and Sejera, and between Yama and Lubyia, which led to renewed fights...

The Jewish colonies were subject to constant terror from the neighbors. Were it not for the steadfastness of the Hebrew guards, the lone attacks might have turned into mass violence and attempts to uproot entire settlements. On the other hand, the Hebrew guard aroused feelings of envy and anger among the local tribes and villages, who feared the end of the golden age of their rule over the area and their monopoly on security and labor in the Jewish colonies. The experience of Sejera and Mescha had already drawn the attention of other Jewish communities in the Galilee and Samaria.

Source: History of the Haganah, Part 1, (Sefer Toldot haHaganah), Israel Defense Force Archives, Israel, 1954, p. 212.

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Rules of guarding and reaction to hostile Arab activities were first and foremost adapted to the custom of blood revenge, the "goom" that was common among the Palestinian population in general and the Arab community in particular. The killing of a person automatically led to a blood feud and the risk of a chain reaction that could bring disaster not only upon Hashomer but also upon the communities it protected. As a result of this danger hanging over everyone's head, it was common practice in the quarrels between Arabs ... that despite hundreds and thousands of bullets flying, the number of actual victims was amazingly small. This phenomenon was the fruit of deliberate restraint. It was common practice among combatants who feared becoming mixed up in a blood revenge. Therefore, an iron rule was also established in the education of a member of Hashomer, according to which he was required to develop the ability to absorb blows, and at the same time, to use only 'dry blows' in order not to spill blood that would immediately raise the issue of blood vengeance. According to Tzvi Nadav, it was permissible to use firearms and shoot in order to strike "only as a last resort when there was no way out. And in these cases, too, we insisted that the member aimed to wound the assailant or kill the horse on which the assailant came – in fact, the model was to extract oneself from a complex situation with honor without firing a shot." ...

The artistry of the guards was reflected in their ability to repel all attackers without loss of personal or public property, and at the same time, without harming the aggressor, or thief, with a mortal blow that would lead to the risk of blood revenge. A member of Hashomer was required to act in a manner that would bring honor to himself and those he represented. These rules of behavior crystallized in the days of the Galilee before the Hashomer broke south into Judah and Samaria. ...

[Blood revenge] was one of the most fateful issues and stirred up the Hashomer for several years. It was aroused in the most painful way after the murder of Yehezkel Nisanov by the Arabs of the Sharon on February 13, 1911, when he and Tzvi Nadav traveled in a cart from Merhavia to Yavne'el. Naturally, the desire arose to avenge the death of a beloved friend who was one of the founders of Bar-Giora and Hashomer. Associated with this was the fundamental problem of whether Hashomer

should adopt the norms of the Arab society in which it operated, and the fear that if they did not adopt the accepted practice of "goom" it would undercut Hashomer's status. The majority of Hashomer members demanded blood revenge, but the committee rejected the claim, saying that it would entangle Hashomer and complicate the methods in which it operated in the settlements. Most of the ongoing debate took place in a secret meeting attended only by members of "Bar-Giora" on the slopes of the Carmel, not far from Atlit, in March 1911. Until the death of Nisanov, the majority tended to reject "goom," but the balance of power in the group flipped after his murder. The main supporters of "blood vengeance" were the members of the "Caucasus Group," but not them alone. In the end, the committee's position was accepted and "goom" rejected, but the Arabs of the Sharon were informed that Hashomer was in a state of "goom" with them. A decision was made to find the murderers and only harm them. According to Shochat, three members, whose names were kept secret, were chosen to carry out the act. In practice, the decision was not implemented and the issue was abandoned for two years, but at the end of 1913 it arose again as a result of the deteriorating security situation in the Galilee.

In a short time, Moshe Barski ... Yosef Salzman ... and Yaakov Feldman was murdered ... The organization's withdrawal, the sense of fatigue and failure, the lack of implementation of decisions regarding settlement, the grave security and finally the murders, the straw that broke the camel's back, led to the formation of an opposition to the committee headed by Tzvi Becker. The opposition demanded a response. This episode was one of a series of problems that arose at the time in Hashomer and threatened anarchy within the organization.

Source: Forefathers of the Israel Defense Forces: The Bar Giora and HaShomer Underground Associations 1907-1935 (BeDerech el haYa'ad), Yaakov Goldstein, Ministry of Defense, Israel, 1994, p. 32, 78.

Document E: “*History of the Haganah*”, (1954)

Precisely during the period when Hashomer reached the height of its strength, the moshavot developed strong opposition to its actions and methods, which grew until Hashomer’s advance was stopped and forced to retreat from its important positions. This opposition derived from three different sources. One was very prosaic, but its influence was great. That was the question of money. We have already mentioned that the shift from maintaining Arab to Hebrew guards raised the security costs by large amounts, at least double the Arab guardianship. ...

The second source of the opposition was the behavior of Hashomer in its relations with the Arabs. ... In general, Hashomer knew how to find the right line – guarding Jewish property and honor without arbitrary harm and without degrading the honor of the Arabs. Many feared, however, that the very appearance of armed Jews and the exclusion of Arabs from the security of the settlements could cause tensions and endanger the peace of the Yishuv. ...

But the third source of the opposition was the most serious and difficult, and involved the form and organization of Hashomer. "Shomrim are a closed organization and not subject to supervision," writes [Yehiel] Tschelenov [a Russian Zionist leader] in his book, apparently referring to the claims he heard during his visit to the Land of Israel from circles opposed to Hashomer guarding the community – “[They follow] strict discipline, which knows only one authority – the authority of their leaders. The representatives of our institutions in this country have no influence on them. And they do not even give them an accounting of what’s going on ...”

Source: History of the Haganah, Part 1, (Sefer Toldot HaHaganah) Israel Defense Force Archives, Israel, 1954, p. 237-238.

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From the spring of 1913, the organization started its retreat and folded back to its base in the Lower Galilee.

In March 1913, Hashomer was forced to leave Hadera, and in October 1913, Rehovot ... The reasons for Hashomer's departure were similar in most of the settlements: Jewish guards were more expensive than Arab ones. The farmers did not take into account what they were saving by preventing theft, but only what they were spending directly from their pockets to pay for the Jewish protection; the farmers were also afraid of increasing tension with surrounding Arabs and tended to blame Hashomer, which behaved with harshness and strictness towards the Arabs. It was difficult for the farmers to accept the almost total control Hashomer had taken upon itself with regard to the movement of Arabs in the settlements and the relations with the neighboring Arab settlements and Bedouin tribes. And the farmers were hurt by the fact that some of the Hashomer members didn't hide their hostility, springing from their socialist-Zionist worldview, toward those that paid their daily bread.

Source: Forefathers of the Israel Defense Forces: The Bar Giora and HaShomer Underground Associations 1907-1935 (BeDerech el haYa'ad), Yaakov Goldstein, Ministry of Defense, Israel, 1994, p. 30.

**Document G: “Forefathers of the Israel Defense Forces,”
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Jamal Pasha was an extreme Turkish nationalist, hostile to foreigners, an attitude influenced by his religious-Muslim worldview. This, together with the hostility he absorbed from Bahaeddin Bey, whom he met in December 1914, crystallized his negative attitude toward the Yishuv and Zionism.

In December 1914 and January 1915, Jamal Pasha extended Bahaeddin Bey’s policy throughout the land. His decrees included: Abolition of Jewish associations and organizations, the prohibition of the use of Hebrew in the bazaar, the cancellation of the militias, the distribution of weapons collected from Jews to the Arabs.

Source: Forefathers of the Israel Defense Forces: The Bar Giora and HaShomer Underground Associations 1907-1935 (BeDerech el haYa’ad), Yaakov Goldstein, Ministry of Defense, Israel, 1994, p. 48.